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1. INTRODUCTION
Experimental auctions have become a popular tool used by
applied economists to assess consumers’ willingness to pay
(WTP) f fd dt Th i li t tl t f th i
4.1. Demand curve (WTP for organic milk)
4. RESULTS • Uniform distribution (same discount per unit)
• Concentrated distribution (all the discount is
applied on the last unit)
4.4. Price-discount effect (Uniform price discount)
 VARIABLES  UNIT1  UNIT2  UNIT3  UNIT4  UNIT5  UNIT6 
CONSTANT          1.939***         2.064***       2.153***         2.071***         2.650***       2.562*** 
DISCOUNT          0.171***         0.231***       0.166***         0.166***         0.181***       0.191*** 
QUANTITY  ‐0.191  ‐0.026  0.140   0.165   0.179         0.197 
FREQ_OF  ‐0.002  ‐0.121  ‐0.173  ‐0.143   0.093         0.137 
HOUSEHOLD ‐0 265 ‐02 1 6 ‐01 7 3 ‐01 6 9 ‐01 4 7 ‐01 6 4
3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
(WTP) for food products. Their popularity partly stems from their
incentive compatibility property where people have the weakly
dominant strategy of revealing their true valuation for a good.
Up to now, researchers in agricultural economics and marketing
used single-unit auctions to carry out their experiments. In
single-unit auctions participants are asked to report their WTP
only for a single unit of the auctioned product, since it is
assumed that people are interested in purchasing one unit
during the auction Sample:9 0s u b jects were randomly drawn from a list of
• Increasing distribution (increasing discount in
the number of units)
















UNIT1 UNIT2 UNIT3 UNIT4 UNIT5 UNIT6
Bias
*** (**) (*) Statistically significant at 1% (5%) (10%) level 
HOUSEHOLD 0.265 0.216 0.173 0.169 0.147         0.164 
GENDER   0.046   0.347   0.618     0.632*          0.830***        0.811*** 
AGE  ‐0.006  ‐0.015  ‐0.019  ‐0.019         ‐0.034***       ‐0.034*** 
EDUCATION  ‐0.264         ‐0.588***       ‐0.929***       ‐0.931***       ‐1.228***       ‐1.235*** 
CHILDREN   0.033   0.264   0.106   0.097   0.231  0.246 
INCOME      ‐0.409**  ‐0.344  ‐0.462   ‐0.433      ‐0.642**     ‐0.606** 
Loglikelihood  ‐24.90  ‐38.07  ‐36.98  ‐36.98  ‐35.56  ‐36.19 
Wald chi2 21.10  32.17  21.60  21.60  29.40  29.56 
Prob > chi2  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
 VARIABLES  UNIT1  UNIT2  UNIT3  UNIT4  UNIT5  UNIT6 
CONSTANT 05 5 4 ‐02 5 8 09 4 6 07 9 1 16 1 6 13 7 1 during the auction.
However, consumers can be interested as well in purchasing not
just one but multiple units of a product. Also, due to increasing
time constraints, many consumers are becoming increasingly
concerned about optimizing shopping efficiency by purchasing
multiple units of products to save several trips to the store.
Using single-unit auctions to assess consumer behavior in
multiple units shopping scenario is misleading and biased, since
p j y
people who are responsible for food shopping in their
household.
Participation fees:1 5 €
Sessions: 9 sessions, 10 subjects per session.















*** (**) (*) Statistically significant at 1% (5%) (10%) level 
CONSTANT 0.554 ‐0.258 0.946 0.791 1.616   1.371 
DISCOUNT         0.145***        0.110***        0.139***        0.144***         0.144***         0.210*** 
QUANTITY  0.599  0.197  0.281   0.056  ‐0.053   0.021 
FREQ_OF       0.751**         1.203***        1.424***        1.624***         1.428***         1.314*** 
HOUSEHOLD  0.392  0.152  0.158  ‐0.108  0.225   0.325 
GENDER  0.164  0.374        ‐0.215  ‐0.123         ‐0.080  ‐0.128 
AGE        ‐0.009  0.002      ‐0.031**  ‐0.030        ‐0.053***        ‐0.052*** 
EDUCATION  0.100  0.408        ‐0.041    0.011  ‐0.091    0.008 
CHILDREN  0.135        ‐0.118        ‐0.091    0.081  ‐0.105   ‐0.124 
INCOME  0.033  0.073   0.023    0.154   0.212    0.268 
Loglikelihood  ‐19.67  ‐11.97  ‐29.34  ‐27.75  ‐31.28  ‐39.10 
Wald chi2 28.56  71.95  49.71  51.90  34.06  28.29 
Prob > chi2  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS
up e us so p p g s c eaos se a d gad b ased, sc e
results are only applicable for the first unit a consumer is willing
to buy and cannot provide information on consumers’ WTP for
subsequent units of the product beyond the first unit.
Due to the limitations of single-unit experimental auction, we
propose here the use of multi-unit auctions where multiple
identical units are auctioned and participants are asked to report
their WTP for each unit.
Among several multi-unit auction mechanisms, we propose the
Steps: 4 steps
Software: Z-Tree, collects bids and determines the
winner(s) and the clearing price
Step1: After taking a seat, each participant received an
envelope which contained 15€ as compensation for their
participation, his or her identification number and a
questionnaire. We then asked participants to complete
the questionnaire.
Step2: We gave each participant a printed material that
4.3. Determinants of the WTP for organic milk
•As expected, the mean of the WTP for organic milk is
decreasing as the number of units being auctioned
increases.
•Participants can benefit from purchasing two units of
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use of an incentive compatible multi-unit auction mechanism,
t h es oc a l l e dm u l t i - u n i tV i c k r ey auction. Multi-unit Vickrey
auction is a generalization of the second price auction. Each
participant is asked to bid on multiple units of the same product
and the winner pays an amount corresponding to the sum of the
bids (excluding his or her own bids) that are displaced by his or
her successful bids (Krishna, 2002).
Step2: We gave each participant a printed material that
included an explanation of how the specific auction works
and some examples to illustrate the auction. After reading
and discussing the instructions, participants were given
an oral explanation supported by some examples in the
board. to permit a better understanding of the auction
mechanism we carried out a training session, auctioning
six identical items of organic milk without economic
exchange.
organic milk (the consumer surplus is positive). The
producer of the auctioned organic milk can, at most,
introduce into the market packages of 2 units.
•The magnitude and the direction of the effect of some
factors determining consumers’ WTP are different
from one unit to another.
•The distribution of price discount in price promotions
matters. We found that price promotion increases
consumers’ WTP more when the distribution of the
CONSTANT 0.334  0.052  0.128 0.264 0.414 0.409
1UNIT       0.654***  ‐0.200    ‐0.355**      ‐0.581***      ‐0.637***      ‐0.585***
2UNITS       0.795***         0.873***      ‐0.194       ‐0.223 ‐0.260 ‐0.308*
3UNITS       0.704***         0.821***       0.732*** 0.160 ‐0.147 ‐0.142
4UNITS       0.985***         1.003***       0.809***       0.775*** ‐0.245 ‐0.197
5UNITS       0.916***         1.106***       0.984***        0.857***         0.818*** 0.394
6UNITS       1.034***         1.181***       1.099***        1.046***         1.027***         1.012***
WEEKLY  0.165*     0.170*  0.116 0.046 ‐0.020 0.024
QUANTITY      0.232***   0.136  0.064 0.039 ‐0.051 ‐0.021
INFORMED   ‐0.227***         ‐0.339***      ‐0.305***      ‐0.321***       ‐0.308***       ‐0.300***
FREQUENCY_OF     0.212**     0.168*  0.143     0.215** 0.140 0.106
FAVORABLE       ‐0.003   0.113     0.202** 0.126      0.256**         0.276***
PRICE_OF       0.034         ‐0.058       ‐0.043 ‐0.111 ‐0.136   ‐0.166*
ENVIRONMENT       0.083   0.047  0.003 ‐0.034 ‐0.021 ‐0.066
2. OBJECTIVES
Step3: Each participant had to submit, again through the
computer, how much he or she was willing-to-pay for
each of the six units of organic milk. Once all participants
finished reporting their bids, the software determines the
winner(s) and the clearing price but this information was
not revealed to participants.
Step4: We provided the participants information about
the price discount after the first round. One third of
participants were offered the uniform price discount;
1.Showing the usefulness of multi-unit auctions in the
valuation of food products by determining:
 Demand curve.
 Consumer surplus.
 Determinant factors of consumer’s WTP for multiple units
4.4. Price-discount effect (Buy six and pay five)
consumers WTP more when the distribution of the
amount of price discount is increasing with the
number of units than when it is uniform. However,
when the amount of price discount is concentrated on
the last unit as commonly practiced by some retailers,
the response of consumers in terms of WTP is
generally not statistically significant.
AVAILABILITY       0.019   0.004  0.122      0.160**       0.184**    0.134*
HOUSEHOLD       0.004   0.003  0.015 ‐0.041 ‐0.069 ‐0.034
GENDER       0.061   0.049  0.018 ‐0.016 ‐0.011 ‐0.009
AGE     ‐0.004         ‐0.001       ‐0.002 ‐0.002 ‐0.004 ‐0.005
CHILDREN     ‐0.058         ‐0.095       ‐0.107 ‐0.017 ‐0.029 0.030
PSEUDO R
2 0.43  0.52  0.54 0.56 0.54 0.55
  *** (**) (*) Statistically significant at 1% (5%) (10%) level 
 VARIABLES  UNIT1  UNIT2  UNIT3  UNIT4  UNIT5  UNIT6 
CONSTANT         1.532***  1.326      0.828**  ‐0.179  ‐0.508  ‐0.669 
DISCOUNT  0.019  0.028  0.031  ‐0.014      0.134*        0.184** 
QUANTITY  0.178  0.306  0.137  0.623         0.900**        0.941** 
FREQ OF 0 442** 0 453** 0 135 02 3 4 0 150 0 153
REFERENCE
pp p ;
those from the second third were offered the “buy six and
pay five” promotion; and subjects from the last third of
the sample were offered the increasing price discount.
Than subject were asked to bid again. At the end of the
auction, one round was chosen randomly to determine
the binding round. The winner(s) in the binding round was
(were) appointed as the winner(s) of the auction.
Krishna, V. 2002. Auction Theory (1st ed.) California: Academic
Press San Diego.
Determinant factors of consumer s WTP for multiple units
of the same product.
2. Showing the usefulness of multi-unit auctions in
Marketing research by:
 Examining the effect of varying the distribution of the
amount of price discount in multi-unit price promotion on
consumer’s WTP.
*** (**) (*) Statistically significant at 1% (5%) (10%) level 
FREQ_OF       0.442**       0.453** 0.135 0.234 ‐0.150 ‐0.153
HOUSEHOLD ‐0.267  ‐0.235  ‐0.612  ‐0.378  ‐0.762  ‐0.645 
GENDER  0.146  0.260  0.279  0.324  0.217  0.231 
AGE ‐0.013  ‐0.017*  0.000  0.001  ‐0.004  ‐0.003 
EDUCATION ‐0.181  ‐0.158  ‐0.242  ‐0.229  0.231  0.277 
CHILDREN  0.374  0.246      0.578*      0.825*         1.213***      1.178** 
INCOME     0.381*       0.473**  0.470  0.455  0.657  0.626 
Loglikelihood ‐2.22  ‐19.62  ‐28.28  ‐43.99  ‐41.06  ‐41.85 
Wald chi2  12.71  15.08  7.08  8.37  16.51  17.94 
Prob > chi2 0.08  0.08  0.62  0.49  0.05  0.03 
 